Syria and MANPADS

An article in the Wall Street Journal came to my attention today. In the article it is reported that Saudi Arabia and other parties supporting the anti-Assad opposition intend to start supplying the rebel forces “for the first time Chinese man-portable air defense systems, or Manpads.”

The announcement is interesting, but also curious, as it has been clear to any interested observer that the opposition forces have had access, even if only to a limited degree, to Chinese MANPADS for some time. Brown Moses’s blog, which has been doing a very nice job of highlighting footage of Syrian opposition weapons, noted the presence of FN-6 (also known as (HY-6) units in Syria in early 2013. Since that time there have been a number of additional sightings. How these missiles were reaching the opposition forces was not immediately clear, but it seems unlikely that they were purchasing them directly on the open market. This missile type has definitely been effectively employed on at least one occasion which implies that the supplier is also offering training. (The missile employed is revealed at 0:24 in the linked video)

The majority of MANPADS seen in the Syrian conflict to date have been examples of Soviet types that have been widely exported and copies or derivatives of which are manufactured in a number of countries, including China. Without getting a close look at the packaging or the missile markings it is difficult, if not impossible, to discern the manufacturer of these missiles from a distance and there is no way of determining whether or not these weapons are imported or obtained from Syrian arsenals. In contrast, the appearance of FN-6 is quite distinctive* and their presence was clearly quickly noticed. As such it is an interesting choice of weapon. It is likely that whoever chose to supply FN-6’s to the rebels wanted this new supply of weapons to be noticed.

Given the established presence of Chinese MANPADS in Syrian opposition hands since at least early 2013 the assertion that the  rebels will be receiving these systems for the first time is clearly false. By openly announcing their intention to supply these systems to the opposition at this time the Saudi Arabian government is clearly trying to send a message. At the same time the statement raises the possibility that Saudi Arabia was the original supplier of these systems back in 2012. At this point we can only hope that the Saudi Arabians make a determined effort to keep track of these weapons once they are in the field. These missiles are significantly more capable than the ubiquitous SA-7 variants that turn up in almost every conflict or insurgency, and many of which likely fell into rebel hands at the start of the Syrian conflict and which may also have been supplied to them from Libyan and other arsenals.

* The key recognition element is the cube-like feature at the forward end of the launch-tube.

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Ukraine and impotence

I’ve been seeing a lot of criticism over President Obama’s Friday evening statement on the Ukrainian situation. Generally complaints that it is too weak, etc.

What do these critics expect from the President and his administration? Do they expect the US to threaten some sort of military intervention against Russia? And if it did, do they seriously expect the threats to be carried out? Do they think that Putin will be swayed by firm words backed by, nothing? This administration has built up a bit of an image of being one in which the US makes strong statements threatening firm action if certain events should occur, only to reinterpret those threats or warnings in such a way as to preclude action when the events do occur.

Contrary to the assessments of those on the right this does not reflect some unique tendency on the part of the Obama administration to refuse to assist US allies, or an unwillingness to defend US rights. To a significant degree the problem is one of making threats that can’t, or were never intended to be backed up by actions. Although such an approach may be effective against weak opponents or those lacking commitment to their own cause, it is very unlikely to result in effective outcomes when employed against ruthless actors determined to protect their perceived core interests in an area of peripheral US interest.

To date there has been no substantive response to what is, so far, a non-violent, military effort by Russia to seize control of portions of Ukrainian territory. This should not come as a surprise. Nothing was done for Georgia when it encountered a very similar situation under the Bush administration. Why would the Ukrainian situation be different?

Czechoslovakian dispute and chose to apply pressure to their ally to surrender important territory critical to their defense inhabited by a substantial minority population with strong connections to a neighboring. All in order to stave off an immediate larger conflagration Part of the tragedy of the event was that a conflagration at this point would have occurred on terms more favourable to the West and would have been considerably less destructive that that which occurred only 1 year later.

One of the more interesting outcomes of this episode will be the impact on the governments and populations of Eastern Europe and the Baltics. These states have made a strong commitment to realign their interests with NATO and the European Union, partially in the hope that this effort will provide a basis for their protection from a resurgent Russia if such a state should ever arise.

It is difficult to see how the current Ukrainian events will not have a significant impact on Poland, Romania and the Baltic States. At a minimum those of the Baltic states with significant Russian minorities will be quite disturbed. Equally Poland cannot be indifferent to a Russian intervention in Ukraine, even it only limits itself to trimming the eastern and southern fringes off the Ukrainian state. If NATO fails to take any action whatsoever the political impact in these countries will be even greater.

Although President Obama’s Friday statement could hardly be construed as an ultimatum, or strong, it is at the same time another statement in which threats are made that are unlikely to be backed by substantive action. In this case the statement asserts that there will be real costs for Russian military action. The immediate back-channel substance given to those threats was the suggestion that the US and EU might not attend the June 2014 G8 summit scheduled to take place in Sochi. Making threats of symbolic action against an actor determined to achieve concrete territorial and political objectives is like waving a used tissue at a bull.

Finally, one of the more troubling aspects of this entire crisis is the extent to which the US government appears to have once again been caught flat-footed. The impression given, rightly or wrongly, is that Russian military action against Ukraine was not anticipated (or if it was, the possibility was taken seriously) and that no serious thought was given to working out US responses in advance. Instead the US leadership, including the military and intelligence arms, appear at least in public, to have been taken completely by surprise.

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