I’ve been wondering for a little while now how long it will be before Iran will become an active marketer of its enrichment technologies. Although the original equipment was obtained through a secret deal with Pakistan (government agency or rogue actors – depending on stance) it is now openly employed and subect to verification by the IAEA.
As far as I know there is absolutely nothing to stop the Iranians selling this technology to any country it so desires that is not currently under UN Security Council sanctions, provided that the sale is declared to the IAEA and the new facilities in country X, Y or Z are subject to IAEA verification.
The Iranian argument in doing this would be that it is fulfilling its international obligations by enabling developing countries access to the benefits of nuclear technology, access that is denied by an oppressive and imperialistic West. Such an approach would probably be quite as difficult to publicly counter as Iran’s nuclear program has been to date.
Working my way through Youtube videos posted from Libya and I came across a set of three videos recording abandoned and looted weapons at a dump outside Sirte in Libya posted by a US reporter who travelled to Libya.
Kudos to Kevin Dawes for going to Sirte, filming the site and then uploading the footage for folks like me to take an interest in.
At first it didn’t seem like anything too exceptional, yet more mortar bombs and SAM-7 Strela’s. The SAM-7s are nothing to be blase about but in truth they pose a very limited threat to any modern military aircraft and without proper training and good placement they represent a limited threat to civilian aircraft.
Having said that, at about 1 minute into the second video we get a good shot of the markings on the side of one of the crates and the news is not pretty. The label on the crate is 9M342 which means that this missile was an IGLA-S, one of the latest models of Russian MANPADS (NATO designation SA-24). This is a much more capable missile that is significantly less vulnerable to the usual anti-MANPADS counter-measures such as flares. Its capability against civilian aircraft, which generally lack even the most basic countermeasures, is likely to be much greater than that of the SA-7.
Skip forward to 3 minutes into the video and we get excellent closeups of the various stencils and ID plates on the crates, something which is a little harder to find on the internet than you might initially expect.
The possibility that any number of these missiles is now circulating in terrorist or other non-governmental circles constitutes a significant increase in the MANPADS threat, initially in the Eastern Mediterranean but more than likely globally over time. The current disorganization in Libya, combined with the weakness of the Egyptian state, adds to the problem by potentially making it easier for the weapons to leave Libya destined for any of a number of different conflict zones.
It is not unreasonable to assume that if these abandoned crates are lying about totally unsecured there is a better than even chance that additional crates, in better condition, have left the area. I expect that the Libyan civil war has those folks working the MANPADS proliferation issue tearing their hair out.
The increasingly likely prospect of a syrian civil war can’t be making things look anymore positive either.
Update
SA-18 gripstock case
Here we go. The third video features a lot more MANPADS footage, though the missiles look more like SA-7s than SA-24s. Also note the silver missile tube at the 18 second point. This is an inert training round definitely looks like a SA-7.
There were two things I did not notice in either of the videos, or to put it another way, I noticed their absence. There were no battery / cooling units and no gripstock / launcher units. These elements in working condition are much more valuable than the missile tubes. I have actually inferred the presence of at least a few gripstocks, probably for the SA-7s from the fellow at 21 seconds who has what look a lot like the standard Strela goggles around his neck. These are found in the briefcase like box that contains the gripstock.
I have just finished reading “One Hundred Days” by Admiral Sandy Woodward. The book is an account of his experience leading the British fleet that recovered the Falklands from the Argentinians in 1982. The book itself is absolutely gripping, and a fantastic insight into the decisionmaking involved in running a naval operation on a shoestring at the other end of the world.
I’m just old enough to remember this little war and one key point that Woodward constantly drives home, which was not clear to the casual observer at the time, is how much of a near-run-thing it all was. By the end of the war the remaining ships of the original force that the British had sent to the South Atlantic were literally falling apart. Throughout the operation they were always one bad day away from failure, living in constant dread of battle damage to HMS Hermes, the largest of their small aircraft carriers.
It strikes me that quite apart from the boost that the war gave to British national pride it also produced some very real benefits for NATO in its standoff with the Soviet Union.
No doubt at the time it seemed to be a bit of a NATO disaster given that the British effectively withdrew the bulk of the Royal Navy from its NATO roles so that its ships and men could be deployed in support of a minor conflict in the South Atlantic. The problems caused were no doubt exacerbated by the loss of a number of warships, either sunk or heavily damaged. Most of the remaining ships sent down as part of the initial fleet that were not sunk still suffered battle-damage to one degree or another, all of which would ensure they could not immediately return to service in the North Atlantic. On top of these losses it is important to keep in mind the disruption of normal refit cycles and the extensive damage inflicted on all of the vessels caused by keeping them at sea for a much longer period than was usual. All of this wear and tear in the form of hull-cracks, worn out guns and engines, broken propellors, unserviceable electronics and a million other things had to be addressed before the ships could resume their normal duties.
Despite all of this however the war produced very real benefits. As the first significant naval conflict since 1945 it tested a great deal of untried equipment and demonstrated the need for numerous changes.
The most important benefit without any doubt has to have been its demonstration of the gross ineffectiveness of the British naval anti-air capability. By revealing flaws in both the hardware and software of the Sea-Wolf and Sea-Dart systems Britain was able to make corrections that would never have happened. Without those changes the Royal Navy would in all likelihood have suffered very heavy early losses in the initial stages of any conflict with the Soviet navy. These two missile systems were so ineffective at first that guns and Seacat missiles proved much more useful. Furthermore it is very clear that in the absence of the small force of Sea Harriers the Royal Navy would have suffered crippling losses and failed to recover the Falklands.
The inability to mount an effective defense against the Exocet cannot have inspired confidence in the fleet’s chances against a determined Soviet anti-ship missile attack. Indeed the difficulties encountered in protecting the fleet against this relatively simple subsonic missile inevitably leads to questions about the ability to defend against the latest generations of Russian supersonic missiles which represent a much more challenging threat. Inevitably it must also raise questions about the capabilty of the U.S. Navy to defend itself effectively against a determined attack, an experience that as far as I know it has not had since the end of World War Two.
I got my copy from the local friends of the library booksale but it is also available on Amazon and is most definitely worth a read.
Today on the Arms Control Wonk website there is fresh discussion of the current buzz suggesting an imminent attack upon Iran intended to damage its alleged Nuclear Weapons programme. Included in the discussion of Iran’s posssible intentions and goals is a quote from a 2007 piece by Avner Cohen.
The route of ambiguity is very convenient for Iran precisely because it is a signatory to the NPT. It will gain the political advantages of having a nuclear option, deterrence and prestige, and it will attempt to reduce its friction with the outside world. Iran will continue to claim that its program is for peaceful purposes only, and it has a right according to the NPT to control all the components for producing nuclear fuel, but at the same time it will encourage the rumors that it is on the verge of producing weapons (or even that it has a bomb in the basement), and therefore it should be considered a nuclear nation for all extents and purposes.
The suggested strategy makes a great deal of sense for Iran. It is also clearly framed to place Iran’s enemies in the uncomfortable position of being obliged to consider accepting a likely Iranian nuclear weapons or attacking what may simply be a potential nuclear weapons capability. If they do the latter it will be difficult to make a convincing case that Iran ever had, or intended to have, a nuclear weapon thus putting the attacker in a very vulnerable diplomatic position. Alternatively, if they accept Iran’s opacity and assume that a useable Iranian nuclear weapon exists they find themselves in a position where Iran is able to significantly constrain their freedom of action while expanding the space in which Iran’s various agencies can pursue their own international goals.
As such it sounds exactly like the sort of sophisticated position that the Iranian leadership would adopt. But that is not my interest today.
What seems to be somewhat overlooked, or downplayed, is the impact on the NPT of an existing member adopting a nuclear ambiguity strategy. Drawing parallels with the instances of India, Israel or Pakistan miss the key point that none of these states were signatories to the NPT. As such none of them even have been subject to the obligations and restrictions of that treaty. It is difficult to see the continuing value of the NPT if it allows member states to seek and obtain a credible state of nuclear ambiguity. As such Iran continues to undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
Acceptance of Iranian nuclear ambiguity would be also acceptance of this undermining. Acceptance would include continuing to treat Iran as being in good standing relative to its NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations. Although Iran’s primary goal for some time now has appeared to be putting in place a nuclear weapons capability I increasingly suspect that a further long-term goal has been undermining the foundations of the NPT.
Proliferating Thoughts 