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Looking for something else entirely I was surprised to come across this July 1950 report in LIFE introducing the horror that is Nerve Gas; another Nazi horror discovered in the last weeks of WW2. The article has a set of helpful illustrations explaining the mechanism by which this powerful new agent affects its victims.

Unfortunately it is a little off-base when it points to the ability of the agents “to destroy the will of enemy troops to resist by literally paralyzing them.”

Ominously it is noted that “some German chemists who worked on the gases are in Russia, developing them for the Soviet.”

The second page helpfully outlines (with newly released photographs) how Allied Forces disposed of the Nazi stockpiles, using “nervous germans” to load the weapons onto trains and then naval gunfire to sink the ship carrying 6,750 tons of nerve gas in the Atlantic. If the germans engaged in the work had any idea what the were working with it is hardly surprising that they were nervous given their total lack of protection.

The nice feature about this is that it uses photos I had not seen in my previous searches for information on historical CW ocean-dumping.

http://books.google.com/books?id=fUoEAAAAMBAJ&lpg=PA67&dq=poison/gas/intitle%3Alife/intitle%3Amagazine&pg=PA67#v=onepage&q&f=true

Iran & nuclear sales?

I’ve been wondering for a little while now how long it will be before Iran will become an active marketer of its enrichment technologies. Although the original equipment was obtained through a secret deal with Pakistan (government agency or rogue actors – depending on stance) it is now openly employed and subect to verification by the IAEA.

As far as I know there is absolutely nothing to stop the Iranians selling this technology to any country it so desires that is not currently under UN Security Council sanctions, provided that the sale is declared to the IAEA and the new facilities in country X, Y or Z are subject to IAEA verification.

The Iranian argument in doing this would be that it is fulfilling its international obligations by enabling developing countries access to the benefits of nuclear technology, access that is denied by an oppressive and imperialistic West. Such an approach would probably be quite as difficult to publicly counter as Iran’s nuclear program has been to date.

Bad MANPADS Day.

Working my way through Youtube videos posted from Libya and I came across a set of three videos recording abandoned and looted weapons at a dump outside Sirte in Libya posted by a US reporter who travelled to Libya.

Kudos to Kevin Dawes for going to Sirte, filming the site and then uploading the footage for folks like me to take an interest in.

At first it didn’t seem like anything too exceptional, yet more mortar bombs and SAM-7 Strela’s. The SAM-7s are nothing to be blase about but in truth they pose a very limited threat to any modern military aircraft and without proper training and good placement they represent a limited threat to civilian aircraft.

Having said that, at about 1 minute into the second video we get a good shot of the markings on the side of one of the crates and the news is not pretty. The label on the crate is 9M342 which means that this missile was an IGLA-S, one of the latest models of Russian MANPADS (NATO designation SA-24). This is a much more capable missile that is significantly less vulnerable to the usual anti-MANPADS counter-measures such as flares. Its capability against civilian aircraft, which generally lack even the most basic countermeasures, is likely to be much greater than that of the SA-7.

Skip forward to 3 minutes into the video and we get excellent closeups of the various stencils and ID plates on the crates, something which is a little harder to find on the internet than you might initially expect.

The possibility that any number of these missiles is now circulating in terrorist or other non-governmental circles constitutes a significant increase in the MANPADS threat, initially in the Eastern Mediterranean but more than likely globally over time. The current disorganization in Libya, combined with the weakness of the Egyptian state, adds to the problem by potentially making it easier for the weapons to leave Libya destined for any of a number of different conflict zones.

It is not unreasonable to assume that if these abandoned crates are lying about totally unsecured there is a better than even chance that additional crates, in better condition, have left the area. I expect that the Libyan civil war has those folks working the MANPADS proliferation issue tearing their hair out.

The increasingly likely prospect of a syrian civil war can’t be making things look anymore positive either.

Update

SA-18 gripstock case

Here we go. The third video features a lot more MANPADS footage, though the missiles look more like SA-7s than SA-24s. Also note the silver missile tube at the 18 second point. This is an inert training round definitely looks like a SA-7.

There were two things I did not notice in either of the videos, or to put it another way, I noticed their absence. There were no battery / cooling units and no gripstock / launcher units. These elements in working condition are much more valuable than the missile tubes. I have actually inferred the presence of at least a few gripstocks, probably for the SA-7s from the fellow at 21 seconds who has what look a lot like the standard Strela goggles around his neck. These are found in the briefcase like box that contains the gripstock.

Falkland’s War Benefits

I have just finished reading “One Hundred Days” by Admiral Sandy Woodward. The book is an account of his experience leading the British fleet that recovered the Falklands from the Argentinians in 1982. The book itself is absolutely gripping, and a fantastic insight into the decisionmaking involved in running a naval operation on a shoestring at the other end of the world.

I’m just old enough to remember this little war and one key point that Woodward constantly drives home, which was not clear to the casual observer at the time, is how much of a near-run-thing it all was. By the end of the war the remaining ships of the original force that the British had sent to the South Atlantic were literally falling apart. Throughout the operation they were always one bad day away from failure, living in constant dread of battle damage to HMS Hermes, the largest of their small aircraft carriers.

It strikes me that quite apart from the boost that the war gave to British national pride it also produced some very real benefits for NATO in its standoff with the Soviet Union.

No doubt at the time it seemed to be a bit of a NATO disaster given that the British effectively withdrew the bulk of the Royal Navy from its NATO roles so that its ships and men could be deployed in support of a minor conflict in the South Atlantic. The problems caused were no doubt exacerbated by the loss of a number of warships, either sunk or heavily damaged. Most of the remaining ships sent down as part of the initial fleet that were not sunk still suffered battle-damage to one degree or another, all of which would ensure they could not immediately return to service in the North Atlantic. On top of these losses it is important to keep in mind the disruption of normal refit cycles and the extensive damage inflicted on all of the vessels caused by keeping them at sea for a much longer period than was usual. All of this wear and tear in the form of hull-cracks, worn out guns and engines, broken propellors, unserviceable electronics and a million other things had to be addressed before the ships could resume their normal duties.

Despite all of this however the war produced very real benefits. As the first significant naval conflict since 1945 it tested a great deal of untried equipment and demonstrated the need for numerous changes.

The most important benefit without any doubt has to have been its demonstration of the gross ineffectiveness of the British naval anti-air capability. By revealing flaws in both the hardware and software of the Sea-Wolf and Sea-Dart systems Britain was able to make corrections that would never have happened. Without those changes the Royal Navy would in all likelihood have suffered very heavy early losses in the initial stages of any conflict with the Soviet navy. These two missile systems were so ineffective at first that guns and Seacat missiles proved much more useful. Furthermore it is very clear that in the absence of the small force of Sea Harriers the Royal Navy would have suffered crippling losses and failed to recover the Falklands.

The inability to mount an effective defense against the Exocet cannot have inspired confidence in the fleet’s chances against a determined Soviet anti-ship missile attack. Indeed the difficulties encountered in protecting the fleet against this relatively simple subsonic missile inevitably leads to questions about the ability to defend against the latest generations of Russian supersonic missiles which represent a much more challenging threat. Inevitably it must also raise questions about the capabilty of the U.S. Navy to defend itself effectively against a determined attack, an experience that as far as I know it has not had since the end of World War Two.

I got my copy from the local friends of the library booksale but it is also available on Amazon and is most definitely worth a read.

http://www.amazon.com/One-Hundred-Days-Falklands-Bluejacket/dp/1557506523/ref=ntt_at_ep_dpt_1

Iran and Nuclear Ambiguity

Today on the Arms Control Wonk website there is fresh discussion of the current buzz suggesting an imminent attack upon Iran intended to damage its alleged Nuclear Weapons programme. Included in the discussion of Iran’s posssible intentions and goals is a quote from a 2007 piece by Avner Cohen.

The route of ambiguity is very convenient for Iran precisely because it  is a signatory to the NPT. It will gain the political advantages of  having a nuclear option, deterrence and prestige, and it will attempt to  reduce its friction with the outside world. Iran will continue to claim  that its program is for peaceful purposes only, and it has a right  according to the NPT to control all the components for producing nuclear  fuel, but at the same time it will encourage the rumors that it is on  the verge of producing weapons (or even that it has a bomb in the  basement), and therefore it should be considered a nuclear nation for  all extents and purposes.

The suggested strategy makes a great deal of sense for Iran. It is also clearly framed to place Iran’s enemies in the uncomfortable position of being obliged to consider accepting a likely Iranian nuclear weapons or attacking what may simply be a potential nuclear weapons capability. If they do the latter it will be difficult to make a convincing case that Iran ever had, or intended to have, a nuclear weapon thus putting the attacker in a very vulnerable diplomatic position. Alternatively, if they accept Iran’s opacity and assume that a useable Iranian nuclear weapon exists they find themselves in a position where Iran is able to significantly constrain their freedom of action while expanding the space in which Iran’s various agencies can pursue their own international goals.

As such it sounds exactly like the sort of sophisticated position that the Iranian leadership would adopt.  But that is not my interest today.

What seems to be somewhat overlooked, or downplayed, is the impact on the NPT of an existing member adopting a nuclear ambiguity strategy. Drawing parallels with the instances of India, Israel or Pakistan miss the key point that none of these states were signatories to the NPT. As such none of them even have been subject to the obligations and restrictions of that treaty. It is difficult to see the continuing value of the NPT if it allows member states to seek and obtain a credible state of nuclear ambiguity. As such Iran continues to undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Acceptance of Iranian nuclear ambiguity would be also acceptance of this undermining. Acceptance would include continuing to treat Iran as being in good standing relative to its NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations. Although Iran’s primary goal for some time now has appeared to be putting in place a nuclear weapons capability I increasingly suspect that a further long-term goal has been undermining the foundations of the NPT.

New publication in hand

The Encyclopedia

It was a little while in arriving  but I have finally received my copy of the 2nd Edition of the Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense. It is really nice to see my name in print again. In this case I was beginning to wonder if the volume was ever going to emerge but the first thing you learn by contributing to projects such as this is that it takes a long time to put together. The editorial team did a great job bringing together the work of so many authors and I am very pleased with the hard copy that I recieved in the post.

Given the likely circulation of the edition there probably won’t be many who actually see my name in print on this one, but that’s no reason not to be a little pleased by my getting to share the limelight with some pretty illustrious names in the field; even if only for a few minutes.

1st page of my entry in the encyclopedia

It is a pity that more people won’t get copies of this book. Quite apart from it being a rather useful resource it is also rather sumptuous. Nicely bound on good quality paper with a simple yet effective design this edition would be a valuable addition to the bookshelves of any institution or individual looking for a quick reference to the many issues and topics surrounding bioterorism defense. Unfortunately as is often the case with books of this type it is rather pricey and definitely not an impulse purchase. In addition there may be those who shy away from such a purchase concerned that dead-tree knowledge lacks relevance ot the modern world. However the alternative is turning to web-based sources, all too many of which are unreferenced, lacking peer review, serving the needs of sectional axe-grinding, and worst of all little more than plagarized regurgitations of the contents of quality publications such as this.

So, in short, if you are interested in the subject matter, and happen across a copy in a library, I strongly suggest that you take the chance to take a close look at this book.

Blog entries can’t always be a priority, well, unless you actually get paid to do it. But when the priorities change and blogging has to slide down the list the unfortunate side effect is missing out on a swathe of great opportunities to think and comment on events in your chosen field.

In this regard the Arab Spring has been particularly generous offering a succession of spurious or even fantastic claims regarding the impending use or sale of “secret” WMD arsenals. These claims, some of which have been embarrassingly outrageous, have mostly, but not all, been tied to Libya and Egypt. As the year progresses it is likely that Syria will attract a little more attention on these lines as well.

The fun part is that this has tended to drown out discussion of some of the more disturbing trends, such as Iran’s continuing pursuit of the various elements needed to provide a workable nuclear weapons capability.

I am going to try and return to my past approach of trying to put out some of these noxious little brushfires while thinking about some historical developments.

Maybe it will work out better this time.

Abandoning Hosni

Its mid-morning on Sunday, January 30, 2011 here on the East Coast of the USA and hopefully events are not going to move so fast as to make this post obsolete before it even hits the internet. I am feeling inclined to throw down a few thoughts about the evolving events in Egypt and the U.S. response to them.

After watching the events in Egypt and the somewhat confused U.S. government response unfold over the last few days I feel driven to put my oar in the water. Although Hosni Mubarak remains President of Egypt at the time I am writing this it seems difficult to see how he will remain in that position for much longer. Quite apart from the popular outrage being witnessed in the streets of Egypt’s cities it is not at all clear that he retains the full support of the army. Given that the military, and more particularly the army, has been the key constituency underpinning Egypt’s political regime since the early 1950s, any significant loss of support in the higher reaches of this institution would sound the death-knell of Mubarak’s presidency.

Here in the U.S. it has become increasingly clear the the Obama administration has abandoned Mubarak. It is not clear if this is a consequence of the administration deciding to cut their losses on the basis of assessments that Mubarak cannot remain in power or if it is instead the result of an active decision to support Mubarak’s ouster as part of a broader policy push. On balance I suspect a decision was taken several days ago to take the chance to replace Mubarak. This would fit nicely with administration efforts to emphasize the extent to which both the Bush and obama administrations were pushing Mubarak, unsuccessfully, to introduce democratic reforms.

Since Friday it has become clear that whatever initial confusion existed has been surmounted. Hilary Clinton has been pushed to the front as the voice of the administration actively tying Mubarak’s hands and making it more difficult for him to take the actions that would have been necessary for him to retain power. By demanding the release of dissidents, free elections, insisiting that security forces not use any violence against protestors, and indicating that there will be a review of the annual subsidy paid to Egypt the Obama administration has, if nothing else, made it abundantly clear to the Egyptian military that there is no support for Mubarak remaining in power to be found in Washington.

On the Sunday morning television circuit Clinton has made it clear, without directly calling for Mubarak’s immediate resignation, that this is what the administration expects.

“We want to see an orderly transition so that no-one fills a void, that there not be a void, that there be a well thought-out plan that will bring about a democratic participatory government,”

This statement is most interesting for what it suggests about the administration’s unwillingness to accept a new strongman as a replacement for Mubarak. The insistence on a democratic transition is a call for much more far-reaching change than would be usual in such a situation. Given the nature of the Egyptian political regime which was succintly described by Lee Smith a few days ago the Obama administration is playing with fire.

Smith’s point was that:

even if [Mubarak] stepped down, or just decided not to run for president later this year, the Mubarak regime would not fall because in reality there is no Mubarak regime as such. Rather, it is a Free Officers regime, one that has lasted almost half a century, or dating back to the 1952 coup that deposed King Farouk. During that period, the regime has survived 3 wars with Israel and another in Yemen. And that’s not all: almost as bad as Gamal abd-el Nasser’s public humiliation after losing the six-day war in 1967 was the regional isolation imposed on Cairo after Anwar Sadat’s peace treaty with Jerusalem. But the regime survived both, as well as Sadat’s assassination and a subsequent civil war throughout the 1980s and 1990s with armed Islamists, many of whom went on to form the leadership of al Qaeda. A regime that has been tested under that kind of fire is unlikely to fold in the face of 50,000 protesters throwing rocks.

To have a true democratic transition this Free Officers regime will have to be cast aside. If this happens and truly free elections take place it is more than likely that the Muslim Brotherhood will emerge as the next Egyptian government. This is not because the Egyptian people necessacarily endorse its particular politics but beause it will be the only mass organization in the country that has sufficient brand recognition to make a substantial showing in a free election. It is entirely likely that there will be hundreds of political parties campaigning for a share of the vote in a confused post-authoritarian environment. This will inevitably result in a hopelessly fractionated Parliament in which a determined united bloc will have an influence that goes far beyond its actual share of the vote.

I suspect that the Obama administration is trying to preserve the most important elements of its alliance with the Egyptian government by trying to make it clear to the Egyptian public that nothing is being done to save Mubarak. Unfortunately there is nothing to suggest that this will be seen as anything other than a cynical ploy designed to preserve a detested peace with Israel. From what I have seen on Al-Jazeera it seems clear enough that the Egyptian public is firmly convinced that the U.S. has been active in propping up the hated Mubarak and that it is furthermore the second most important enemy of the Egyptian people after Israel. This attempt to curry favor is in all likelihood domed to failure.

Just because a government is popularly elected doesn’t mean that it will be more likely to support Western interests or get along with its neighbors.

Today is seeing a great deal of fuss and bother surrounding the initial wikileaks releases of US State Department cables. Given that the initial release is so small and that there is so very much to come it is clear that those who are writing today generally have very little to go on in terms of describing the potential impacts or revelations. It remains to be seen whether the approach of stringing the releases out over a period of months will enhance the desired impact or diminish it as audience fatigue sets in.

But whatever else might be the case it appears that the releases will provide a bit of a micro-boon for the nonproliferation and arms control community who will apparently see some 15,000 or more documents released into the public arena. Although some of these will undoubtedly be incredibly mundane it is clear from the first batch that we will also get greater insight into the details of breaches of the various control regimes than has been the case in the past. To date the emphasis appears to be on the MTCR and Iran’s nuclear efforts but I don’t doubt for a minute that we will see much more before the race is run.

This year the Friends Of The Library Sale (FOTLS) coincided very neatly with the seasonal clearance sale at Borders. The result is a somewhat eclectic collection of books brought in over a matter of a couple of weeks for around $20. Can’t complain.

2010 - Fall - Workish Books

David Albright’s book, Peddling Peril, came from Borders for a mere $1.08 which is a price that is hard to deny and which I don’t doubt doesn’t help him or the publisher at all. I feel a little bad about it but not so much that i am going to go out and buy it at a hgher price. The blurb page is more than a little lurid but the content seems reasonable.

Mohaddessin’s Islamic Fundamentalism on the other hand is pure gold. In tracking back sources in an attempt to find the original starting point for accusations about Iran’s chemical weapons programme and the locations and capabilities of the various facilities my searching eventually led me to this book. Interestingly it is almost never directly referenced but if you follow the threads this is where you end up. Getting hold of it from a library was a bit of a drama at the time and naturally I had to give it back again much sooner that I would have liked. So you can imagine my joy at coming across a virtually pristine copy at the FOTLS on $2.00 hardback day.

I’d been thinking about buying a used copy of McGeorge Bundy’s book for a while now. there is no harm in reading the memoirs of those who were involved in the shaping of policy and the making of decisions. Naturally such books have to be balanced with scholarly research covering the same periods to provide balance, or even correction but at $0.50 I can have no complaints. The same applies to The Wizards of Armageddon. Another book to continue the process of bulking out my Cold War nuclear history section.

The worst thing is that it is becoming harder and harder to find books I want to buy at the FOTLS. My first couple of sales saw me reaping a substantial harvest. The last cople of year however have seen a significant reduction in my crop. At first I thought it might simply be that I had bought everything of interest to me but on reflection I can’t evade the conclusion that the selection has changed and there are simply less interesting books being offered in the sections that interest me most. It is not that I am seeing the same books that I already own over and over again.

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